Aftermath
Rules of engagement *** I HOPE THIS HAS CHANGED
Approximate location of bombing, Aden Harbor, Yemen
The destroyer's rules of engagement, as approved by the Pentagon, kept its guards from firing upon the small boat (unknowingly loaded with explosives) as it neared them without first obtaining permission from the Cole's captain or another officer.[34]
Petty Officer John Washak said that right after the blast, a senior chief petty officer ordered him to turn an M-60 machine gun on the Cole' fantail away from a second small boat approaching. "With blood still on my face," he said, he was told: "That's the rules of engagement: no shooting unless we're shot at." He added, "In the military, it's like we're trained to hesitate now. If somebody had seen something wrong and shot, he probably would have been court-martialed." Petty Officer Jennifer Kudrick said that if the sentries had fired on the suicide craft "we would have gotten in more trouble for shooting two foreigners than losing seventeen American sailors."[34]
[edit] Consequences
President Bill Clinton declared, "If, as it now appears, this was an act of terrorism, it was a despicable and cowardly act. We will find out who was responsible and hold them accountable". Some critics have pointed out that, under U.S. law, an attack against a military target does not meet the legal definition of terrorism[35] (see: 22 USC § 2656f(d)(2)).
On January, 19, 2001, the U.S. Navy completed and released its Judge Advocate General Manual (JAGMAN) investigation of the incident, concluding that Cole's commanding officer Commander Kirk Lippold "acted reasonably in adjusting his force protection posture based on his assessment of the situation that presented itself" when Cole arrived in Aden to refuel. The JAGMAN also concluded that "the commanding officer of Cole did not have the specific intelligence, focused training, appropriate equipment or on-scene security support to effectively prevent or deter such a determined, preplanned assault on his ship" and recommended significant changes in Navy procedures. In spite of this finding, Lippold was subsequently denied promotion and retired at the same rank of commander in 2007.[36]
In Afghanistan the bombing was a "great victory for bin Laden. Al-Qaeda camps ... filled with new recruits, and contributors from the Gulf States arrived ... with petrodollars."[17]
Both the Clinton Administration and the Bush Administration have been criticized for failing to respond militarily to the attack on the USS Cole before September 11, 2001. The 9/11 Commission Report cites one source who said in February 2001, "[bin Laden] complained frequently that the United States had not yet attacked [in response to the Cole]... Bin Laden wanted the United States to attack, and if it did not he would launch something bigger."[37]
Evidence of al-Qaeda's involvement was inconclusive for months after the attack. The staff of the 9/11 Commission found that al-Qaeda's direction of the bombing was under investigation but "increasingly clear" on November 11, 2000. It was an "unproven assumption" in late November. By December 21 the CIA had made a "preliminary judgment" that "al Qaeda appeared to have supported the attack," with no "definitive conclusion."[38]
Accounts thereafter are varied and somewhat contradictory. Then-National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice told the Commission that when the administration took office on January 20, 2001, "We knew that there was speculation that the 2000 Cole attack was al Qaeda... We received, I think, on January 25 the same assessment [of al-Qaeda responsibility]. It was preliminary. It was not clear."
The Washington Post reported that, on February 9, Vice President Dick Cheney was briefed on bin Laden's responsibility "without hedge."[39]
Newsweek reported that on the following day, "six days after Bush took office," the FBI "believed they had clear evidence tying the bombers to Al Qaeda."[40]
These conclusions are contrasted by testimony of key figures before the 9/11 Commission, summarized in the 9/11 Commission Report. Former CIA Director George Tenet testified (page 196) that he "believed he laid out what was knowable early in the investigation, and that this evidence never really changed until after 9/11."[41] The report suggests (pages 201–202) that the official assessment was similarly vague until at least March 2001:
On January 25, Tenet briefed the President on the Cole investigation. The written briefing repeated for top officials of the new administration what the CIA had told the Clinton White House in November. This included the "preliminary judgment" that al Qaeda was responsible, with the caveat that no evidence had yet been found that Bin Ladin himself ordered the attack... in March 2001, the CIA's briefing slides for Rice were still describing the CIA's "preliminary judgment" that a "strong circumstantial case" could be made against al Qaeda but noting that the CIA continued to lack "conclusive information on external command and control" of the attack.[41]
According to Dr. Rice, the decision not to respond militarily to the Cole bombing was President Bush's. She said he "made clear to us that he did not want to respond to al Qaeda one attack at a time. He told me he was 'tired of swatting flies.'" The administration instead began work on a new strategy to eliminate al-Qaeda.[42]
As a result of the USS Cole bombing, the U.S. Navy began to reassess its anti-terrorism and force protection methods, both at home and abroad. The Navy stepped up Random Anti-Terrorism Measures (RAM), which are meant to complicate the planning of a terrorist contemplating an attack by making it difficult to discern a predictable pattern to security posture.[43]
In November 2001, the Navy opened an Anti-Terrorism and Force Protection Warfare Center at Naval Amphibious Base (NAB) Little Creek, in Virginia Beach, Virginia, with the objective of developing tactics, equipment and training to combat terrorists.[44]
On November 3, 2002, the CIA fired a AGM-114 Hellfire missile from a Predator UAV at a vehicle carrying Abu Ali al-Harithi, a suspected planner of the bombing plot. Also in the vehicle was Ahmed Hijazi, a U.S. citizen. Both were killed. This operation was carried out on Yemeni soil.
On September 29, 2004, a Yemeni judge sentenced Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri and Jamal al-Badawi to death for their roles in the bombing. Al-Nashiri, believed to be the operation's mastermind, is currently being held by the U.S. at Guantanamo Bay detention camp.[45] Al-Badawi, in Yemeni custody, denounced the verdict as "an American one." Four others were sentenced to prison terms of five to 10 years for their involvement, including one Yemeni who had videotaped the attack.
Then in October 2004, the Navy consolidated the forces it deploys for anti-terrorism and force protection under a single command at NAB Little Creek. The new Maritime Force Protection Command (MARFPCOM) was activated to oversee the administration and training of the expeditionary units the Navy deploys overseas to protect ships, aircraft and bases from terrorist attack. MARFPCOM aligned four existing components: the Mobile Security Forces, Naval Coastal Warfare, Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD), and Expeditionary Mobile Diving and Salvage Forces.[46]
On February 3, 2006, 23 suspected or convicted Al-Qaeda members escaped from jail in Yemen. This number included 13 who were convicted of the USS Cole bombings and the bombing of the French tanker Limburg in 2002. Among those who reportedly escaped was Al-Badawi. Al-Qaeda's Yemeni number two Abu Assem al-Ahdal may also be among those now on the loose.[47]
Wikinews has related news: Conspirator of USS Cole attack freed from prison
On October 17, 2007, al-Badawi surrendered to Yemeni authorities as part of an agreement with al-Qaeda militants. Following his surrender, Yemeni authorities released him in return for a pledge not to engage in any violent or al-Qaeda-related activity, despite a $5 million reward for his capture. Two other escapees remained at large.[48][49]
In June 2008, the United States charged Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri with planning and conducting the attack. The US planned to seek the death penalty in his case.[36] On February 5, 2009, the United States dropped all charges against al-Nashiri "without prejudice" to comply with President Obama's order to shut down the military prison at Guantanamo Bay.[citation needed] The government reserves the right to file charges at a later date.
In 2009, U.S. federal judge Kimba Wood released $13.4 million in frozen assets belonging to Sudan to be awarded to 33 spouses, parents, and children of the sailors killed in the attack. The money was awarded based on the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002. Previously, the court had found Sudan culpable in facilitating the attack on the destroyer. Said John Coldfelter, father of Kenneth Coldfelter who was killed in the bombing, "It's about time something was done. It's taken so much more time than we thought it should take."[50]
The US Navy created a simulation of the bombing for training drills at Naval Station Great Lakes, Illinois.[51]
[edit] Memorial
A memorial to the victims of the attack was dedicated at Norfolk Naval Station in Virginia on October 12, 2001. It was erected along the shore of the Elizabeth River near
oK, the former CO of the Cole imho, got the shaft due to rules. 2nd, the families of the Cole got some really big bucks, thank the Lord. 3rd. The small boat should have never been allowed that close without a boarding party stopping it. 4th, If and u know the word If, this has been in ww2, that small boat would have been blown out of the water. I hope the Navy has learned from this, rules of engagement what a joke in war time.
Rules of engagement *** I HOPE THIS HAS CHANGED
Approximate location of bombing, Aden Harbor, Yemen
The destroyer's rules of engagement, as approved by the Pentagon, kept its guards from firing upon the small boat (unknowingly loaded with explosives) as it neared them without first obtaining permission from the Cole's captain or another officer.[34]
Petty Officer John Washak said that right after the blast, a senior chief petty officer ordered him to turn an M-60 machine gun on the Cole' fantail away from a second small boat approaching. "With blood still on my face," he said, he was told: "That's the rules of engagement: no shooting unless we're shot at." He added, "In the military, it's like we're trained to hesitate now. If somebody had seen something wrong and shot, he probably would have been court-martialed." Petty Officer Jennifer Kudrick said that if the sentries had fired on the suicide craft "we would have gotten in more trouble for shooting two foreigners than losing seventeen American sailors."[34]
[edit] Consequences
President Bill Clinton declared, "If, as it now appears, this was an act of terrorism, it was a despicable and cowardly act. We will find out who was responsible and hold them accountable". Some critics have pointed out that, under U.S. law, an attack against a military target does not meet the legal definition of terrorism[35] (see: 22 USC § 2656f(d)(2)).
On January, 19, 2001, the U.S. Navy completed and released its Judge Advocate General Manual (JAGMAN) investigation of the incident, concluding that Cole's commanding officer Commander Kirk Lippold "acted reasonably in adjusting his force protection posture based on his assessment of the situation that presented itself" when Cole arrived in Aden to refuel. The JAGMAN also concluded that "the commanding officer of Cole did not have the specific intelligence, focused training, appropriate equipment or on-scene security support to effectively prevent or deter such a determined, preplanned assault on his ship" and recommended significant changes in Navy procedures. In spite of this finding, Lippold was subsequently denied promotion and retired at the same rank of commander in 2007.[36]
In Afghanistan the bombing was a "great victory for bin Laden. Al-Qaeda camps ... filled with new recruits, and contributors from the Gulf States arrived ... with petrodollars."[17]
Both the Clinton Administration and the Bush Administration have been criticized for failing to respond militarily to the attack on the USS Cole before September 11, 2001. The 9/11 Commission Report cites one source who said in February 2001, "[bin Laden] complained frequently that the United States had not yet attacked [in response to the Cole]... Bin Laden wanted the United States to attack, and if it did not he would launch something bigger."[37]
Evidence of al-Qaeda's involvement was inconclusive for months after the attack. The staff of the 9/11 Commission found that al-Qaeda's direction of the bombing was under investigation but "increasingly clear" on November 11, 2000. It was an "unproven assumption" in late November. By December 21 the CIA had made a "preliminary judgment" that "al Qaeda appeared to have supported the attack," with no "definitive conclusion."[38]
Accounts thereafter are varied and somewhat contradictory. Then-National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice told the Commission that when the administration took office on January 20, 2001, "We knew that there was speculation that the 2000 Cole attack was al Qaeda... We received, I think, on January 25 the same assessment [of al-Qaeda responsibility]. It was preliminary. It was not clear."
The Washington Post reported that, on February 9, Vice President Dick Cheney was briefed on bin Laden's responsibility "without hedge."[39]
Newsweek reported that on the following day, "six days after Bush took office," the FBI "believed they had clear evidence tying the bombers to Al Qaeda."[40]
These conclusions are contrasted by testimony of key figures before the 9/11 Commission, summarized in the 9/11 Commission Report. Former CIA Director George Tenet testified (page 196) that he "believed he laid out what was knowable early in the investigation, and that this evidence never really changed until after 9/11."[41] The report suggests (pages 201–202) that the official assessment was similarly vague until at least March 2001:
On January 25, Tenet briefed the President on the Cole investigation. The written briefing repeated for top officials of the new administration what the CIA had told the Clinton White House in November. This included the "preliminary judgment" that al Qaeda was responsible, with the caveat that no evidence had yet been found that Bin Ladin himself ordered the attack... in March 2001, the CIA's briefing slides for Rice were still describing the CIA's "preliminary judgment" that a "strong circumstantial case" could be made against al Qaeda but noting that the CIA continued to lack "conclusive information on external command and control" of the attack.[41]
According to Dr. Rice, the decision not to respond militarily to the Cole bombing was President Bush's. She said he "made clear to us that he did not want to respond to al Qaeda one attack at a time. He told me he was 'tired of swatting flies.'" The administration instead began work on a new strategy to eliminate al-Qaeda.[42]
As a result of the USS Cole bombing, the U.S. Navy began to reassess its anti-terrorism and force protection methods, both at home and abroad. The Navy stepped up Random Anti-Terrorism Measures (RAM), which are meant to complicate the planning of a terrorist contemplating an attack by making it difficult to discern a predictable pattern to security posture.[43]
In November 2001, the Navy opened an Anti-Terrorism and Force Protection Warfare Center at Naval Amphibious Base (NAB) Little Creek, in Virginia Beach, Virginia, with the objective of developing tactics, equipment and training to combat terrorists.[44]
On November 3, 2002, the CIA fired a AGM-114 Hellfire missile from a Predator UAV at a vehicle carrying Abu Ali al-Harithi, a suspected planner of the bombing plot. Also in the vehicle was Ahmed Hijazi, a U.S. citizen. Both were killed. This operation was carried out on Yemeni soil.
On September 29, 2004, a Yemeni judge sentenced Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri and Jamal al-Badawi to death for their roles in the bombing. Al-Nashiri, believed to be the operation's mastermind, is currently being held by the U.S. at Guantanamo Bay detention camp.[45] Al-Badawi, in Yemeni custody, denounced the verdict as "an American one." Four others were sentenced to prison terms of five to 10 years for their involvement, including one Yemeni who had videotaped the attack.
Then in October 2004, the Navy consolidated the forces it deploys for anti-terrorism and force protection under a single command at NAB Little Creek. The new Maritime Force Protection Command (MARFPCOM) was activated to oversee the administration and training of the expeditionary units the Navy deploys overseas to protect ships, aircraft and bases from terrorist attack. MARFPCOM aligned four existing components: the Mobile Security Forces, Naval Coastal Warfare, Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD), and Expeditionary Mobile Diving and Salvage Forces.[46]
On February 3, 2006, 23 suspected or convicted Al-Qaeda members escaped from jail in Yemen. This number included 13 who were convicted of the USS Cole bombings and the bombing of the French tanker Limburg in 2002. Among those who reportedly escaped was Al-Badawi. Al-Qaeda's Yemeni number two Abu Assem al-Ahdal may also be among those now on the loose.[47]
Wikinews has related news: Conspirator of USS Cole attack freed from prison
On October 17, 2007, al-Badawi surrendered to Yemeni authorities as part of an agreement with al-Qaeda militants. Following his surrender, Yemeni authorities released him in return for a pledge not to engage in any violent or al-Qaeda-related activity, despite a $5 million reward for his capture. Two other escapees remained at large.[48][49]
In June 2008, the United States charged Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri with planning and conducting the attack. The US planned to seek the death penalty in his case.[36] On February 5, 2009, the United States dropped all charges against al-Nashiri "without prejudice" to comply with President Obama's order to shut down the military prison at Guantanamo Bay.[citation needed] The government reserves the right to file charges at a later date.
In 2009, U.S. federal judge Kimba Wood released $13.4 million in frozen assets belonging to Sudan to be awarded to 33 spouses, parents, and children of the sailors killed in the attack. The money was awarded based on the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002. Previously, the court had found Sudan culpable in facilitating the attack on the destroyer. Said John Coldfelter, father of Kenneth Coldfelter who was killed in the bombing, "It's about time something was done. It's taken so much more time than we thought it should take."[50]
The US Navy created a simulation of the bombing for training drills at Naval Station Great Lakes, Illinois.[51]
[edit] Memorial
A memorial to the victims of the attack was dedicated at Norfolk Naval Station in Virginia on October 12, 2001. It was erected along the shore of the Elizabeth River near
oK, the former CO of the Cole imho, got the shaft due to rules. 2nd, the families of the Cole got some really big bucks, thank the Lord. 3rd. The small boat should have never been allowed that close without a boarding party stopping it. 4th, If and u know the word If, this has been in ww2, that small boat would have been blown out of the water. I hope the Navy has learned from this, rules of engagement what a joke in war time.
